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Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, Structuring
Proportionality, and Imagining Graduated Sanctions
by Daniel Kanstroom"
All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the
enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. I
[I]gnorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole
2cause ofpublic calamities and of the corruption of governments.
A policy granting greater security of residence to long-term
immigrants who have chosen to live for a long period in the host
country is preferable to the use of expulsion, which is inhuman and
senseless.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Substantial interior immigration enforcement will undoubtedly continue
in the United States, whether or not the legislative and executive branches
can craft a legalization program. 4 Though some enforcement is surely
necessary, the system's continuity will also be due in part to inertia. The
size of the current enforcement system is stunning, affecting many millions
of noncitizens and removing many hundreds of thousands annually. 5
* Professor of Law, Thomas F. Carney Distinguished Scholar, and Director, Human Rights
Program, Boston College Law School. This Article is dedicated to Dave Martin from whose exemplary
collegiality and practical wisdom I have learned more than I can describe, even-indeed especially-as
we have sometimes disagreed. Thanks, too, to the student organizers of this Symposium, to Dean
Vincent Rougeau, and to my colleagues, Paulo Barrozo, Jessica Chicco, Mary Holper, Kari Hong, and
Katie Young, for helpful suggestions.
'JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. 1.6 (1859).
2 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Fr. 1789).
3 Eur. Consult. Ass., Non-Expulsion of Long-Tenn Immigrants, Doc. No. 8986 (2001), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FilelD=9216&Language=en.
4 By interior enforcement, I mean, simply, those mechanisms that are utilized on U.S. soil,
including at ports of entry. I do not mean to imply that other forms of enforcement are not important or
in need of change. For example, the doctrine of consular non-reviewability and the relative lack of
rights of deportees post-departure remain very serious problems.
5 One recent study has concluded that ICE and CPB combined for some six million formal
removals during the ten-year period from 2003 to 2013. This does not include many millions of
informal "returns." See Marc Rosenblum & Kristen McCabe, Deportation and Discretion: Reviewing
the Record and Options for Change, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Oct. 2014),
http://migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-and-discretion-reviewing-record-and-options-change.
For a very useful consideration of costs and budget issues, see COMMITTEE ON ESTIMATING COSTS OF
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: A PATH TO BETTER PERFORMANCE (2011), available
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Equally impressive are its costs and its complexity. One recent study aptly
described the system as "formidable machinery," involving a "complex,
cross-agency system that is interconnected in an unprecedented fashion.",
6
Spending on immigration enforcement was about $18 billion in FY 2012,
and has totaled some $186 billion since 1986.7 If we add to this federal
spending an extensive pattern of recent state and local involvement in
immigration enforcement, the costs, effects, and tentacle-like reach of the
system become truly impressive. Moreover, its political salience is clear, as
enforcement is a linchpin of discussions over comprehensive immigration
reform. Virtually none of this is likely to change, absent much more
dramatic re-structuring than has yet been proposed. It should change,
however, as the system needs major recalibration. This is a propitious
moment for serious rethinking.
This Article is a foray into deep waters. Its main purpose is to sketch
and to justify a better framework for interior immigration enforcement.
Such a framework should satisfy two major goals. First, it should engage
meaningfully with "public order," operational efficiency, and basic human
rights. Put another way, it must be both effective and legitimate. Second, it
should govern the major aspects of interior immigration enforcement
architecture: prosecutorial discretion, statutory/regulatory structure,
adjudicative interpretation, and adjudicative discretion. 8 The Article's
conclusion is that the best way to accomplish this is, first, to dramatically
de-emphasize immigration enforcement against long-term legal residents;
and second, to take the notions of proportionality and graduated sanctions
seriously in structural-rather than in discretionary-ways.
II. FRAMING: TOWARDS SMART(ER) ENFORCEMENT
It has long been obvious that immigration enforcement aims at three
primary goals: prevention of unauthorized entrants, removals of various
categories of noncitizens, and deterrence of future immigration law
at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13271/budgeting-for-immigration-enforcement-a-path-to-better-performance
[hereinafter BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT].
6 Doris Meissner et al., Immigration Enforcement in the United States: the Rise of a Formidable
Machinery, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Jan. 2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/
immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-machinery.
71id.
8 For a full discussion of the latter two concepts, see Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in
the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 818 (1997);
Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the "Rule" of
Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 161 (2006).
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violations. 9 These goals are not now-nor have they ever been-fully
achievable. Thus, an underlying leitmotif of immigration enforcement is
analogous to national security and criminal law: enforcement may reduce
and control perceived problems; it cannot eliminate them. The Department
of Homeland Security ("DHS"), for example, recognizes that it seeks "to
manage," not to seal the border.' 0
The breadth of immigration enforcement goals and the magnitude of
immigration control in practice have long inspired various types of
conceptual framing. Some rather ominous models appear tragi-comic in
retrospect, especially as to rights protections and depictions of deportees.
For example, Timothy Pickering, a main enforcer of the dreadful 1798
Alien and Sedition Acts, once said, "[H]e must be ignorant indeed who
does not know that the Constitution was established for the protection and
security of American citizens, and not of intriguing foreigners."'" Mitchell
Palmer, the Attorney General who led infamous deportation raids in the
early twentieth century against alleged anarchists and radicals, once
described in congressional testimony, "the sly and crafty eyes of many of
[the deportees]" from which he saw "cupidity, cruelty, insanity, and
crime." He went on to note "their lopsided faces, sloping brows, and
misshapen features" in which he recognized, "the unmistakable criminal
type."12
More recent frames have generally endeavored to be more nuanced and
balanced. 13 The 1997 Report to Congress of the U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform, for example, used the concept of "credibility" to
describe its enforcement vision, stating: "A credible immigration system
requires the effective and timely removal of aliens determined through
constitutionally-sound procedures to have no right to remain in the United
States.' 4 The Obama Administration has developed a similar framework
colloquially called "smart enforcement." Its basic priorities have been the
9 BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 41. There are, to be sure, sub-
goals such as retribution, crime control, national security, etc.
'0 Meissner et al., supra note 6, at 3.
" Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Adams (Sept. 29, 1798), in 3 OCTAVIUS PICKERING &
CHARLES W. UPHAM, THE LIFE OF TIMOTHY PICKERING 475 (1873).
12 Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges Made Against Department of Justice by Louis
F. Post Among Others Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 66th Cong. 27 (1920) (statement of A. Mitchell
Palmer, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
'3 See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN
DIASPORA (2012) (describing various historical models).
"4 COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND
IMMIGRANT POLICY 126 (1997). The commission focused to a great degree on absconders, but also
suggested "establishing priorities and numerical targets" Id. at 131.
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removal of noncitizens convicted of crime, the removal of recent illegal
entrants, and the removal of noncitizens who have disobeyed formal
immigration orders, most particularly so-called "absconders."' 15 The first
part of this approach--criminal enforcement-has been a strong
component since the start of "smart enforcement." Indeed, the percentage
of interior removals based on criminal convictions has risen dramatically,
from 53% in FY 2008 to 87% in 2013. 16 A total of 216,810 people
removed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") in FY
2013 had been convicted of a crime.' 7 However, the nature of those crimes
(many have been quite minor) and the mechanisms used to catch people
(i.e., the Secure Communities program) have raised serious concerns, a
point to which I return below.
The etymology of "smart enforcement" illustrates the evolving
priorities and involvement of both immigrant advocates and the Obama
Administration. In the immigration context, the phrase may be traced to
Frank Sharry, then director of the National Immigration Forum, an
advocacy group. Sharry used it in response to Representative Tom
Tancredo (R-CO), who had criticized Bush Administration immigration
reform proposals as a "mockery of the idea of rule of law."' 8 Sharry
responded that national security required a combination of "smart
enforcement and smart policies." ' 9 "Smart enforcement" was later adopted
by Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), who linked it to comprehensive reform:
"Strong and smart enforcement measures are a critical part of immigration
reform, but we cannot regain control of our borders by simply cracking
'5 As Janet Napolitano proudly reported in 2011:
In FY 2010, ICE removed 79,000 more aliens who had been convicted of a
crime than it did in FY 2008. As a result, for the first time ever ... over 50
percent of the aliens removed by ICE in a fiscal year were convicted criminals.
Of those removed with no confirmed criminal conviction, more than two-thirds
were either apprehended at the border or were repeat violators of our
immigration laws.
Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Senator Dick Durbin (Aug. 18, 2011),
available at http://shusterman.com/pdf/napolitanoletter81811 .pdf.
6 Rosenblum & McCabe, supra note 5, at 11.
'7 FY 2014 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
18 Renee Williams, GOP Lawmaker Blasts Bush on Immigration, UPI NEWS, June 29, 2005,
http://www.upi.com/Business-News/Security-Industry/2005/06/29/GOP-lawmaker-blasts-Bush-on-
immigration/92071120076453/.
19 Id.
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down harder., 20 Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) adopted the phrase in 2006,
with a similar linkage to a broader program: "We need tough and smart
enforcement at the border and throughout our country. And we need
realistic immigration laws that bring immigrants out of the shadows,
,,21paying taxes, learning English and contributing to our communities.
Reid was responding to colleagues such as Representative Steve King (R-
IA), who had said during the same Senate session: "Anybody that votes for
an amnesty bill deserves to be branded with a scarlet letter, 'A' for
amnesty, and they need to pay for it at the ballot box in November.,
22
Compared to discourse of the type used by Representatives Tancredo
and King, it is unsurprising that "smart enforcement" emerged as a
successful administrative framework for reform. The trope has had
considerable staying power, especially as immigration legislation has
stalled. As then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano put it in March 2009: "At
some point... our president and congress will re-engage on the underlying
immigration law. Right now, my task is to make smart enforcement
decisions on the law that we have. 23
The main political virtues of "smartness" as a guiding principle are that
it is unassailable as a concept and ostensibly content-neutral. Its obvious
vice, however, is that its apparent technocratic merits conflict with the
inevitable value-based decisions demanded by the immigration
enforcement system. It is, in the end, at best vacuous and at worst
obfuscatory. Similar criticism has been leveled at the now-prevalent
priorities used to structure discretionary enforcement decisions. A recent
study, for example, has suggested that the controversial so-called "Morton
memos" of 2010 and 2011 did not actually represent a particularly
substantial policy shift. There were two reasons for this. First, they define
DHS priorities "expansively." Second, DHS, along with legacy INS, "has
always focused on similar enforcement priorities. ' 24 This critique may be a
20 Sen. Kennedy Speaks on Need for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, US FED. NEWS, Oct. 25,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 17362262.
2' Reid Floor Statement on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS (Mar.
30, 2006), http://democrats.senate.gov/2006/03/30/reid-floor-statement-on-comprehensive-immigration-
reformi/#.VRMYcfzF9h4. As he continued, "I strongly support enforcement, but I also know that
enforcement alone can't solve the problem." Id.
22 Dana Milbank, The Great Senate Immigr'A'tion Debate, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 31,
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/30/AR2006033001798.html.
23 Cordula Meyer, Interview with Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano: 'Away from
Politics of Fear,' SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
interview-with-homeland-security-secretary-janet-napolitano-away-from-the-politics-of-fear-a-613330.html.
24 Rosenblum & McCabe, supra note 5, at 26. It is clear, however, that the Bush Administration
had focused more on workplace enforcement and thus on "low priority" removals. In this sense, "smart
enforcement' has been viewed as corrective.
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bit overstated, however, as there have clearly been substantial shifts of
focus in certain enforcement areas.
Recent history has demonstrated the difficulties of not only defining,
but also managing smart enforcement. The complexity and fluidity of the
system is daunting. The Department of Justice ("DOJ"), for example, was
criticized in 2009 by a House report for its unclear budget requests relating
to immigration enforcement:
Immigration workload-DOJ's budget request fails to
articulate, or account for, the increased resource
requirements that result from other agencies' activities. This
is particularly true with respect to immigration, where the
Department has been repeatedly forced to redirect internal
resources in order to provide necessary judicial support and
basic care for aliens turned over to DOJ by DHS. The
practical effect of these redirections has been cuts to non-
immigration programs at DOJ.25
Perhaps even more troubling, the vast sprawl of the immigration
enforcement system seems to have eluded the attempts of even the sharpest
objective minds to capture it. Indeed, a committee of the National
Academy of Sciences "began its work fully intending to [specify and
estimate] a quantitative statistical model of the federal immigration
enforcement system.",26 The committee ultimately concluded, however,
"that building a quantitative model of the system's behavior that would be
useful for budgeting was impractical, both now and in the foreseeable
future., 27 This finding was a rather stunning revelation at the time and it
does not seem to have gotten better in light of the recent complexity
engendered by massive new administrative initiatives.
It is also obvious that enforcement costs vary tremendously with policy
choices. Consider the costs of detention and hearings before immigration
judges. In 2009, estimated costs were about $6,400 per detainee. The
Executive Office for Immigration Review's ("EOIR") estimate of
"spending per matter handled" rose from slightly more than $600 per
25 BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 7 (citing the report
accompanying DOJ's fiscal 2009 appropriations that mandated this study).
26 Id. at 9.
27 Id. ("[Tihe committee concludes that its recommended approach will lead over time to improved
budget estimates, but it cannot quantify the expected outcomes.").
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matter in 2003 to more than $800 in 2010.28 This figure, however, is
subject to wide variations, as the cost of deporting a long-term lawful
permanent resident ("LPR") who may have counsel and who may raise
various defenses to removal and request discretionary relief is clearly much
higher. It is hard to calculate the exact number of such cases. However,
according to EOIR statistics, some 70,000 to 80,000 LPR's were placed in
removal proceedings from 2003 to 2013.29 Best estimates are that some
36,000 people were removed during that ten-year period.30
A dramatic shift has also occurred in the use of criminal prosecutions
against border-crossers. The number of criminal prosecutions of
immigration offenses has risen sharply in recent years, especially along the
Southwest border. 3 1 As Allegra McLeod has noted, between 1990 and
2010, immigration offenses became the most common federally-prosecuted
crimes in the United States.32 Over the ten-year period from 2001 to 2010,
criminal immigration case filings by U.S. Attorneys increased by 138%
nationwide. 33 In 2010 alone, some 85,000 immigration-related criminal
cases were processed in federal magistrate or district courts, up from about
25,000 in 2002. 34
Though the apparent goal of such prosecutions has been to increase
deterrence efficiently, their efficacy remains in doubt. Moreover, they have
brought some worrisome distortions into the criminal justice system. The
improper use of "aggravated identity theft" charges and mass processing
during the raids in Postville, Iowa was an early harbinger. 3' Another
example of such distortions was a major initiative, dubbed "Operation
Streamline," launched by the U.S. Attorney's Office ("USAO"), federal
district court judges, and U.S. Border Patrol supervisors in the Del Rio
Border Patrol sector of the Western District of Texas in December 2005. It
soon expanded to eight Border Patrol sectors in our federal court districts.
Under this program, USAO filed criminal charges against as many
2 Id. at 20.
29 These statistics can be found on Tab NI of each of the Statistics Yearbooks from fiscal year
2003 to 2013. Statistics Yearbooks, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/syb2000main.htm (last updated Mar. 2015).
3o E-mail from Marc Rosenblum, Deputy Dir., U.S. Immigration Policy Program, to author (Oct.
22, 2014 at 11:06 EST) (on file with author) (describing the underlying data).
3' BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 77 ("Immigration ... cases
accounted for 30 percent of the new flow of criminal cases into U.S. attorneys' offices nationwide in
2006 and 2007, 36 percent in 2008, 40 percent in 2009, and 44 percent in 2010.").
32 Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 107 (2012).
33 Budgeting for Immigration Enforcement, supra note 5, at 77.34 1d. at 57.
" See KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 57-58.
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noncitizens as possible who had allegedly crossed the Southwest border
illegally. Groups of defendants then had their cases heard at the same time,
as federal prosecutors sought routinized plea bargains under which the
migrants-who were subject to felony reentry charges-were permitted to
plead guilty to misdemeanor charges before magistrate judges (these are
known colloquially as "flip flops").3 6 Such mass processing raises serious
concerns about proper representation, due process, and many other
important legal values.
III. A RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
The assessment of how "smart enforcement" should work has changed
rather dramatically over the past few years. As noted, the Obama
Administration has long focused on interior removals of those convicted of
crimes and on border removals (i.e., removals of undocumented
noncitizens at or near the border).37 Criminal removals (a diverse, highly
problematic category discussed in more detail below) accounted for some
80% of interior removals during FY 2011 to FY 2013.38 The number
peaked at around 140,000 in FY 201 1.39 It should be noted that most of
these "criminal aliens" were not convicted either of violent crimes or even
of crimes that ICE had designated as the most serious. Many were long-
term legal residents.40 Though overall goals have not much changed, the
"smart" approach has experienced many quick pivots. Consider, for
example, the most recent dramatic revisions to the once highly-touted but
also much-criticized Secure Communities Program.4' As DHS Secretary,
Jeh Johnson laconically put it in a memo dated November 20, 2014: "The
36 See BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 57.
37 Border removals represented 70% of all removals in FY 2013. Rosenblum & McCabe, supra
note 5, at 3.
38 Id. Indeed, the largest single category from 2003 to 2013 was immigration crimes, demonstrating
a dramatic increase in the use of the criminal justice system to enforce immigration laws.
39 
id.
40 See also Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lafiul Permanent Residents, 122 YALE
L.J. 2394 (2013).
41 The Secure Communities Program was established in 2008 and slated to expand to every state
and local jail in the country by 2013. Its basic model was to check arrestees' fingerprint data against
national immigration databases as part of the booking process. ICE screeners would then forward
information about potentially removable noncitizens to local ICE officials, who would then take
custody of and deport arrestees following completion of their jail sentences. For a discussion of the
early development of Secure Communities, see KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 39-41; Secure
Communities and ICE Deportation, A Failed Program?, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/349/.
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Secure Communities program, as we know it, will be discontinued.,
42
Johnson plaintively noted that, "the reality is the program has attracted a
great deal of criticism, is widely misunderstood, and is embroiled in
litigation; its very name has become a symbol for general hostility toward
the enforcement of our immigration laws."43 And yet this program was
recently-and continues to be-heralded by many as the very sine qua non
of "smart enforcement.
' 4
The most recent versions of "smart enforcement" embody a number of
positive-albeit transient and discretionary-attributes. 4 It must also of
course be assessed together with the Administration's Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") and Deferred Action for Parental
Accountability ("DAPA") initiatives.41 But the latest iterations continue to
raise the most fundamental issue: Can we balance-in an enduring,
structural way-public order, efficiency, legitimacy, and basic human
rights? I suggest that the way forward is to go beyond such mantras as
42 Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Dep't of Homeland Sec.
Officers, Secure Communities (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/I 4_1120 memo secure communities.pdf.
43 Id.
44 KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 39-41; see also Julia Preston, Republicans Resist Obama's Move
to Dismantle Apparatus of Deportation, NY TIMES, Jan. 15, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/us/secure-communities-immigration-program-hattle. html?_r-0.
While I happen to agree with those who thought the former version was crudely inefficient and unfair
for many reasons, Johnson inexplicably chose a new program name that is sure to inspire mockery, if
not comparisons to Jimmy Carter's "moral equivalent of war" ("MEOW") response to the energy
crisis: The new program is to be known as the "Priority Enforcement Program" ("PEP"). Perhaps a
peppy enforcement model will have greater durability than a smart one did.
41 It is described in a longer Memorandum, also sent by Jeh Johnson, on November 20, 2014 in
which he lays out a much-refined version of enforcement priorities. Memorandum from Jeh Johnson,
Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Dep't of Homeland Sec. Officers, Policies for the Apprehension,
Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14 1120 memoprosecutorial discretion.pdf.
Johnson expressly rescinds virtually all prior memoranda.
46 The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") program grants "deferred action" to
individuals who came to the U.S. as children and who meet certain educational requirements. See
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Dep't of Homeland Sec.
Officers, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion With Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children (Jun. 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s 1-exercising-
prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. The DACA program was
expanded with the creation of a new program, "DAPA," or Deferred Action for Parental
Accountability, which grants "deferred action" status to parents of U.S. citizens and green card holders
who have been residing in the United States for five years and who meet certain other requirements.
See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Dep't of Homeland Sec.
Officers, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or
Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/14 1120_memo deferred action.pdf.
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credibility and "smart enforcement" and to return to first principles. This
approach requires consideration of three distinct questions:
1. What are the goals of interior immigration enforcement?
More specifically, what is the end to which each distinct
form of removal (or other enforcement method) is the
means?
2. What basic human rights are implicated by various forms of
immigration enforcement?
3. How-in light of our answers to the previous two
questions-might we creatively reimagine immigration
enforcement?
A. The Goals of Enforcement
As to the first question, there are two basic, primary goals for interior
enforcement by removal and related mechanisms.47 These are: Extended
border control and post entry social control. By "primary goals" I mean to
distinguish major desiderata from a host of possible secondary goals such
as crime control, "national security," ideological control, public health,
foreign policy, respect for the "rule of law," maintenance of federal
supremacy over state laws, deterrence, de facto regulation of labor
markets, etc. To be sure, the secondary goals of interior enforcement
system differ for different government actors-legislative,
executive/administrative, and judicial.48 Much litigation has also erupted
over state and local initiatives versus federal enforcement authority.49 Such
schisms are fundamental and not historically unique to this era. 50 The
current system has grown slowly, incrementally, and reactively, having
been crafted as much by accretion as by comprehensive revision. The
system in action thus inevitably reflects an evolving, fluid conversation
among the Congress, the executive branch, federal agencies, federal
47 For fuller explications of these distinctions, see Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control,
and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889,
1891 (2000); DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(2007); KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH, supra note 13.
48 Indeed, as current debates show, even the goals of the Congress and the President seem to differ.
49 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (invalidating certain
Arizona laws relating to immigration, while provisionally upholding a law that allowed Arizona state
police to investigate the immigration status of an individual stopped, detained, or arrested if there is
"reasonable suspicion" that the person is in the country illegally).
50 See generally KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 47.
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judges, and, perhaps, state legislatures, municipal officials, state and local
enforcement agencies, and state court judges.
Obvious complexities also arise when we seek to understand the goals
of specific practices. For example, the removal of a noncitizen who has
violated terms of entry of which she was expressly informed may be
justified on contractual grounds: 51 "She made a deal," one might say, "and
that is that.",52 But justification is not the same thing as an end goal. No
nation-state ever invented or enforced terms of admission in order to
protect the ideal of contract law.5 3 The contractual form of, for example,
the visa-waiver entry model was designed to achieve the goal of orderly
border control. Indeed, this is also true of all non-immigrant visa
conditions of entry and stay. On a still deeper level, of course, the idea of
maintaining the nation-state itself through border and residence control of
noncitizens may also be understood as goals. 54 This is true-as
constitutional lawyers might say-both "facially" (i.e., why does the
nation-state system exist at all?) and "as-applied" (i.e., what ought to be
the limits of sovereign power?). For purposes of this Article, however, I
will tacitly accept the basic legitimacy of the nation-state. This acceptance
implies the basic legitimacy of some forms of border control and therefore
of extended border control removal. (It does not imply, of course,
acceptance of arbitrary or disproportionately harsh implementation of such
enforcement.)
Though some types of removal thus may seem to implicate multiple
goals, the two forms work as polar heuristics. They also explain certain
practices with precision. Expedited removal " at or near the border
illustrates extended border control, pure and simple. Removal of long-term
LPRs 56 for crime or other conduct (or associations) illustrates post-entry
5' See generally Hiroshi Motomura, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006).
52 Cf Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding the government was
permitted to retroactively change the terms of admission for Chinese noncitizens.)
53 I am of course aware of the so-called Contract Labor Laws of the nineteenth century. However,
the goal of these laws was protection of labor markets, not to vindicate contracts as such.
54 See, e.g., Joseph Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (2013); Jacqueline Stevens, STATES
WITHOUT NATIONS." CITIZENSHIP FOR MORTALS (2009).
" See INA § 235(b)(l)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(A)(i) (2012) (stating that an "alien" who lacks
proper documentation or has committed fraud or willful misrepresentation of facts to gain admission
into the United States is inadmissible and may be removed from the United States without any further
hearings or review, unless the "alien" indicates either an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of
persecution).
56 The concept of legal permanent residence was specifically crafted in 1921, though the notion of
presumptive permanence long pre-dates that statute. See Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2, 42 Stat. 5
(1921).
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social control.57 These people have already been admitted, supposedly
permanently. There is no expiration date for U.S. LPR status. One may
remain in that status for life, and millions have done so over many years.
The control of the border and protection of nation-state sovereignty remain
theoretically relevant in such cases, but only as deep background concerns.
The fragility of the status of LPRs is designed to control post-entry
behavior, not to vindicate control of the border in any proximate sense.
As we ponder the future of enforcement, we should seriously consider
the basic legitimacy differences between these two basic types of removal.
I do not suggest that either form is inherently illegitimate, but the
differences matter when we ask what the future should look like and why.
Thus, to reiterate: Once one accepts the basic legitimacy of the nation-
state, then deportation of noncitizens as a tool of extended border control
is both logically necessary and potentially legitimate so long as certain
secondary questions are properly accounted for. For example, what sorts of
rights claims ought to "trump" extended border control? Other relatively
tractable questions have been answered by a mlange of U.S. constitutional
interpretations, statutory schemes, administrative regulations, judicial and
administrative case law, and-increasingly--exercises of executive
prosecutorial discretion. Examples of such questions include: How long
after entry is extended border control still legitimate? What sorts of factors
might excuse unauthorized entry or presence? What sorts of family
relationships should be taken into account? What procedures are required
to protect fundamental rights and the legitimacy of the system? Et cetera.
As for post-entry social control, the threshold legitimacy arguments are
much more complicated. Removal of otherwise legal residents due to post-
entry conduct does not primarily vindicate border control. What, then,
justifies it? Its tensions become especially apparent when we consider that
the U.S. legal system has long accepted retroactive changes to such laws.
Put simply, a legal permanent resident may be removed for conduct
which-when it was done-was not a basis for removal.59 The reasons for
57 An interesting challenge to this model may be the recent prioritization of removal of those who
have been criminally convicted of immigration law violations. Essentially, it seems to me that the
proper categorization of such removals depends upon the nature and timing of the offense.
58 See 2013 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/
yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-lawful-permanent-residents (last updated June 16, 2014).
59 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including
any effective date), the term [aggravated felony] applies regardless of whether the conviction was
entered before, on, or after [September 30, 1996]."); see also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)
(analyzing the retroactive removal of relief provision: "statute that is ambiguous with respect to
retroactive application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously prospective"); In re
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this run deep in the history of immigration jurisprudence. Essentially, it is a
by-product of the Supreme Court's determination in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States,60 that removal is a civil-as opposed to a criminal sanction.
Though one can discern some recent erosion of the strong, formalistic
version of this doctrine, it still stands.61
Leaving aside various rights claims and the presumptive illegitimacy of
retroactive laws, let us consider why we deport otherwise legal residents
for post-entry criminal conduct. The most common answers fall into two
categories: First, one might say that "we do this simply because we do
this." This framing may seem ironic, but it is not facetious. The argument
has two variants. The most basic is that we differentiate citizens (full
members with rights to remain) from non-citizens and the main point of
difference is that the latter, by definition, are always living in a kind of
tenuous probationary status. 62 This argument has apparent virtues of
clarity; but it is formalistic and circular. 63 Those who reason this way may
(incorrectly) cite Hannah Arendt's notion of citizenship as "the right to
have rights." 64 But such strong versions of citizenship status raise many
difficulties. Why, for example, should the results of what Ayelet Shachar
has termed an arbitrary "birthright lottery" confer such powerful rights?
65
Is this not essentially a form of feudalism? Moreover, citizenship has
never, in fact, been completely immune from revocation by governments
under extreme circumstances. Thus, even the vaunted citizen's right to
remain is more of a continuum of protection (or an almost irrebuttable
presumption) than an absolutely impenetrable edifice. And does not the
Lettman, 22 1. & N. Dec. 365, 366 (BIA 1998) ("[A]ny alien who has been convicted of a crime
defined as an aggravated felony, and who was placed in deportation proceedings on or after March 1,
1991, is deportable regardless of when the conviction occurred."); cf Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
1479 (2012) (holding INA § 101 (a)(I 3) is not retroactive).
60 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
61 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289; Daniel Kanstroom,
Deportation and the Right to Counsel: Padilla v. Kentucky and the Challenging Construction of the
Fifth-and-a-HalfAmendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (2011).
62 See generally Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (1992).
63 One way to explore its limitation is to ask how its proponents would respond to denationalization
of citizens for, say, terrorist acts or affiliations. The most logical answer from this standpoint would be,
essentially, "denationalization of citizens is wrong because citizenship inherently implies immunity
from forced removal."
64 It is incorrect to assume that Arendt believed that citizenship should be the "right to have rights."
Rather, her view was descriptive of a particular historical period. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Human
Rights for All is Better than Citizenship Rights for Some, EUROPEAN UNION DEMOCRACY
OBSERVATORY ON CITIZENSHIP, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-forum/citizenship
-forum-cat/I 268-the-retum-of-banishment-do-the-new-denationalisation-policies-weaken-citizenship?
showall=&start-9 (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
65 Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (2009).
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strong, formalist version of citizenship tend to unduly relegate the rights
claims of noncitizens? Put another way, is not the forced removal of a
long-term legal resident for a minor offense the functional equivalent of
banishment?
Another version of the "we do this because we do this" argument is
contractual. By this I mean a justification of the following type:
Noncitizens who apply for LPR (or other legal) status know or should
know that they risk losing that status if they are convicted of crimes. Thus,
"a deal is a deal." But this argument does not withstand much scrutiny. 66
For one thing, many LPRs gain their status as infants or children. They are
aware of no such conditions and cannot justly be expected to know of them
intuitively. Second, to the best of my knowledge, there is no such explicit
warning or guidance that is given to LPRs when they gain such status.
Indeed, the USCIS Form 1-797 that is sent to successful applicants for
adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence has charming features
that imply the opposite. It is entitled, for example "Welcome to the United
States of America." It repeats the word, "permanent," at least nine times.
There is also nothing that explains the risks to those who enter in legal
nonimmigrant statuses, such as tourists, students, workers, etc. Third, even
if there were such general warnings for adults (and one may reasonably
assume some awareness by adults of the risks of criminal conduct), the
welter of crimes and other conduct that may or may not result in removal
renders the contract analogy very problematic.
The comparative weakness of these justifications illustrates the utility of
the term, post-entry social control: We deport otherwise legal residents for
post-entry criminal conduct for the same reasons that we punish citizen
criminals. These include such classic goals of criminal justice as
incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution. 67 These goals raise other
legitimacy problems, however. First, research shows quite clearly that
deportation works poorly as a crime control mechanism. 68 Second, even to
the extent that deportation may make sense in certain scenarios for crime
control, its use raises deep questions about its constitutional status. If crime
control goals are taken seriously, then it is hard to accept either the
venerable civil/criminal doctrine or the related idea that deportation is not
punishment for constitutional law purposes. Much of the regime of post-
entry social control deportation thus should be subject to at least some of
66 See MOTOMURA, supra note 51.
67 See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 47.
68 KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 88-89 (citing the work of Rubrn Rumbaut).
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the norms of the criminal justice system. 69 Those who face its sanctions
should have, as a minimum, the rights to bail and to appointed counsel.
They should also be protected against ex post facto laws, double jeopardy,
and double punishment.
Even a more limited regime of post-entry social control deportation for,
let us say, suspected foreign terrorists, severe human rights abusers, and
certain other serious criminals, leaves many substantial questions. We must
again ask the questions I posed above for extended border control, i.e.:
How long after entry is removal still legitimate? What evidence is
required? What sorts of factors might excuse post-entry conduct? What
sorts of family relationships should be taken into account? What
procedures are required to protect fundamental rights and the legitimacy of
the system? Is this double punishment?
There is also a serious-if delicate--question of societal responsibility.
As a 1953 Presidential Commission noted (during an era when post-entry
social control deportations were relatively rare):
Each of these aliens is a product of our society. Their
formative years were spent in the United States, which is
the only home they have ever known. The countries of
their origin, which they left-in two cases during infancy,
in another, at the age of 5 years-certainly are not
responsible for their criminal ways .... If such a person
offends against our laws, he should be punished in the
same manner as other citizens and residents of the United
States and should not be subject to banishment from this
country.70
Thus, when we focus on legitimate enforcement goals, those of
extended border control removal are more simply and directly tied to
immigration control than are those of post-entry social control removal.
Therefore, it seems logical that more attention ought to be paid-and
resources devoted to-enhancing the extended border control system. If
we were to dramatically de-emphasize post-entry social control removal
this would not ignore its main goals. It would simply return them to the
enforcement system that is best equipped to handle them: the criminal
justice system. I am, of course, aware of the political difficulty of
69 See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 47; Kanstroom, supra note 61.
7' PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 202
(1953).
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implementing such a suggestion. Little is more politically popular than
cracking down on "criminal aliens." One can surely appreciate why the
latest Jeh Johnson Memo on "Apprehension, Detention and Removal"
continues to prioritize post-entry social control removal. Indeed, most of
the top sub-categories of enforcement deemed "Priority 1" and "Priority 2"
relate to undefined goals of "public safety," "national security," and crime
control.71 But let us at least view the legitimacy differential as worthy of
consideration as we move to a consideration of basic rights.
B. Basic Rights
One surely does not have to believe in open borders to recognize that
rights claims limit enforcement options.7 2 For example, neither U.S. nor
international law generally permits the exclusion or the removal of those
who qualify as refugees or of those who would face torture in the country
to which they would be returned.7 3 (Of course, there are exceptions and
both of these substantive categories are enormously complex and fluid.)
Put briefly, basic substantive rights that must be considered are: protection
71 Cf Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec. to All
Immigration & Customs Enforcement Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civilenforcement priorities.pdf (establishing those who pose "a danger to
national security or a risk to public safety" as "priority one," recent illegal entrants as "priority two,"
and immigration fugitives or those who "otherwise obstruct immigration controls" as "priority three");
Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec. to All Immigration &
Customs Enforcement Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency
for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf, Memorandum
from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec. to All Immigration & Customs
Enforcement Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel, Prosecutorial
Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf; Memorandum from Doris
Meissner, Comm'r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. to All Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
Regional Directors, District Directors, Chief Patrol Agents, Regional and District Counsel, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092970/INS-
Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner- 11-7-00; Memorandum from Julie L.
Myers, Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec. to All Immigration & Customs Enforcement Field
Office Directors and Special Agents in Charge, Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion (Nov. 7, 2007),
available at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/reference/additional-materias/immigration/enforcement-
detention-and-crimina-justice/govemment-documents/Myers-Memo-Custody-Discretin-I 1-7-07.pdfview.
72 See generally Daniel Kanstroom & Jessica Chicco, The Forgotten Deported: A Declaration on
the Rights of Expelled and Deported Persons, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. (forthcoming 2015)
[hereinafter Kanstroom & Chicco, The Forgotten Deported]; Daniel Kanstroom & Jessica Chicco,
Draft Declaration on the Rights of the Forcibly Expelled, POST-DEPORTATION HUMAN RIGHTS
PROJECT, http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/humanrights/pdf/DRAFT%/2ODeclaration%20on%
20the%20Rights%20otP/20Expelled%20and%20Deported%20Persons.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
71 See sources cited supra note 72.
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from harm (including not only refugee protections and Convention Against
Torture (CAT) claims, but also protections during detention, transit, and
removal), protection of human dignity, family unity, "affiliation" rights,
7 4
privacy rights, special protections for vulnerable persons (e.g., children),
anti-discrimination/equal protection (including prohibitions on group
expulsions), property rights, and proportionality. More contested (or
perhaps "evolving") substantive rights claims include broader definitions
of family, rights to work, protections of accrued government benefits,
possible protection of a right to stay in "one's own country"75 and such
post-removal issues as a right to visit family (with appropriate constraints),
rights to collateral motions, rights to appeal, etc. Well-recognized basic
procedural rights include: fair hearing/due process rights (e.g., notice,
opportunity to be heard by competent authority, representation [though not
necessarily appointed counsel], right to an interpreter, anti-arbitrariness)
and various-though often depreciated versions of-constitutional
protections such as a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,76 and Fifth
Amendment protections against the use of coerced evidence. 77 Though
space limitation precludes a full listing of sources here, such rights claims
take into account both U.S. constitutional adjudication and, increasingly,
international human rights norms. 78 This Article will focus most on two
particular aspects of rights claims: proportionality and what Hiroshi
Motomura has aptly termed, "immigration as affiliation.,
79
C. Proportionality and Affiliation
A rich scholarly literature has developed in recent years about the
concept of proportionality, both in immigration enforcement and more
generally. 80 In the immigration concept, proportionality has most typically
74 See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 51.
75 See, e.g., Devon Whittle, Nystrom v. Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007 (18 July
2011), 19 AUSTL. INT'L L. J. 235 (2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2270894.
76 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (limiting exclusionary rule in deportation
proceedings).
77 Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977) (upholding Fifth Amendment protections in
deportation proceedings).
78 See KANSTROOM, supra note 13, chs. 6-7. See generally Kanstroom & Chicco, The Forgotten
Deported, supra note 72.
79 MOTOMURA, supra note 51, at 81-90.
80 See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS (Doron Kalir trans.) (2012); Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L.
REV. 1651, 1671-79 (2009) (arguing that due process requires proportionality and proposing statutory
relief from removal to permit immigration judges to ensure proportionality); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting
Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1684-85 (2009); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law
and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 415-16 (2012).
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been seen as a constraint on enforcement, often in the guise of a
discretionary balancing test. Juliet Stumpf has contrasted criminal law
which, she notes, is "animated by the idea that the punishment must be
proportionate to the crime," with immigration law, which has increasingly
adopted more of a one size fits all model, where deportation is "the
ubiquitous penalty for any immigration violation." 81 Mike Wishnie
usefully defines proportionality as, simply, "the notion that the severity of
a sanction should not be excessive in relation to the gravity of an
offense."8
Though U.S. courts have remained relatively oblivious to
proportionality constraints in immigration law, international law has long
respected the concept. Various international instruments recognize the
importance of family unity and the rights of parents and children to reside
together.83 The European Court of Human Rights has made clear that
deportation must be "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 8 4 At the
most basic level, this means that judges must balance the individual's
circumstances against the nation-state's interest in removal. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has similarly intoned, "It is well-
recognized under international law that a Member State must provide non-
citizen residents an opportunity to present a defense against deportation
based on humanitarian and other considerations.
'" 8 5
Proportionality is a constraint on power that mandates consideration of
certain extraneous factors in order to justify removal. Some of these factors
may be encapsulated by the concept of affiliation. As Hiroshi Motomura
notes, the Supreme Court has highlighted the ties that many lawful
8i Stumpf, supra note 80, at 1683-84, 1687, 1732 (proposing a system that should consider: "(1)
the gravity of the violation, taking into account the nature of the violation and any consequences, (2)
the benefit to the United States of imposing the proposed sanction and, conversely, any harm to the
United States, the noncitizen, or others resulting from its imposition, and (3) the stake that the
noncitizen has in remaining in this country"); see also, Juliet Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, 18 FED.
SENT'G REP. 264, 264 (2006).
82 Wishnie, supra note 80, at 416.
83 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 16, G.A. Res. 217 (111) A, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled
to protection by society and the State."); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
art. 17, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
(prohibiting "arbitrary or unlawful interference with . . . family [or] home"); Convention on the Rights
of the Child art. 7, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1456 (Nov. 20, 1989) (guaranteeing "as far as possible,
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents").
84 See, e.g., Dalia v. France, 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14-15.
85 Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 81/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/ll.139, doc. 21 5 (2010); see also id. at 11 56 ("[Tlhe IACHR
particularly emphasizes that the best interest of minor child must be taken into consideration in a
parent's removal proceeding.").
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immigrants had to the United States: "Aliens like citizens pay taxes and
may be called into the armed forces ... may live within a state for many
years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the
state." 86 This analysis has long justified a strict scrutiny of state
discrimination based on alienage. 87 Is it not also a powerful constraint on
removal? As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the answer, as noted, has
been no. However, statutory immigration law protections, such as
"Registry" 88 have taken affiliation into account by protecting long-term
residents from removal under certain circumstances. Similarly, various
discretionary mechanisms have recognized "positive equities" of affiliation
and have also elevated certain family ties to central roles in adjudicating
waivers and "relief' from removal.89 Indeed, the President's recent DAPA
initiative expressly takes certain family ties into account as threshold bases
for the positive exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 90 Immigration
enforcement, in short, has never been completely oblivious to either
substantive or procedural rights claims. Let us move, then, from the
consideration of what rights are at issue to more specific suggestions about
how we might best balance the goals of interior enforcement, efficacy, and
basic rights.
IV. CREATIVE RE-IMAGINATION: STRUCTURAL PROPORTIONALITY
AND GRADUATED SANCTIONS
When we consider the metrics by which we should measure the quality
of enforcement, we find a wide range of options, commonly deployed but
rarely examined fundamentally. The basic options include: utilitarian
efficacy (i.e., what works?); political pragmatism (i.e., what is popular?);
managerial or bureaucratic optimization (i.e., what is best organized?);
financial costs; strong deference to rights claims including Kantian (or
religious) moral concern for human dignity; and the best models of the
86 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (citing Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250 (E.D.
Pa. 1970)).
87 id.
88 INA § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012).
89 See, e.g., Cancellation of Removal, INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012).
0 DAPA, or Deferred Action for Parental Accountability, grants "deferred action" status to parents
of U.S. citizens and green card holders who have been residing in the U.S. for five years and meet
certain other requirements. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
Dep't of Homeland Sec. Officers, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of
U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/14 1120_memo deferred action.pdf.
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"rule of law" in all of its complexity (including discretion as a quasi-legal
concept). It is obvious that no single such criterion should or could
dominate all questions. Still, it is not only possible, but inevitable (and
perhaps wise), to emphasize certain criteria above others in support of
creative policy choices.
Efficacy is often touted as the best primary metric. However, as noted,
it is apparent that neither extended border control nor post entry social
control has been especially effective. Much of the reason for the
ineffectiveness has been the inherent impossibility of the mission. Interior
border enforcement has been deemed rather ineffective by most experts, as
most obviously confirmed by an undocumented population of some eleven
or twelve million people. Although flows subsided sharply during the
economic downturn, most researchers ascribe this much more to economic
factors than to enforcement. 91 Indeed, one study found that some nine out
of ten of those who were apprehended on their first attempt and who were
then eventually released back to Mexico succeeded in entering undetected
on a second or third attempt. More than half of all unauthorized entrants
were not apprehended at all.92 Various mechanisms have then been put in
place to try to address this phenomenon, most of which-such as criminal
prosecution of border-crossers-are quite expensive and, as noted, not
unproblematic. Indeed, border enforcement and extended border control
removals may have the exact opposite effect intended by their supporters.
One 1997 study that measured the probability of apprehension at the
border, found that it increased the likelihood of undocumented migration.
93
Similarly, a 2010 study found that deportations of undocumented
noncitizens from the United States also tended to increase undocumented
migration. 94 The reasons for this apparently counter-intuitive fact require
one to dig deeper into how such enforcement actually relates to migration.
Increased enforcement increases the duration of trips and reduces the
9' See BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 34 ("As U.S. economic
conditions have deteriorated in the past 5 years, enforcement activities have increased; but rising
enforcement does not seem to have played a significant role in lowering the likelihood of
undocumented migration.").
92 See id. at 32; see also CENTER FOR COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION STUDIES, MEXICAN
MIGRATION AND THE U.S. ECONOMIC CRISIS: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Wayne A. Cornelius
et al. eds., 2010); Wayne A. Cornelius, Evaluating Recent U.S. Immigration Control Policy: What
Mexican Migrants Can Tell Us, in CROSSING AND CONTROLLING BORDERS: IMMIGRATION POLICIES
AND THEIR IMPACT ON MIGRANTS' JOURNEYS 191-203 (Mechthild Baumann et al. eds., 2011).
93 Douglas S. Massey & Kristen E. Espinosa, What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A
Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis, 102 AM. J. OF SOC. 939-99 (1997).
"' Douglas S. Massey & Fernando Rios, Undocumented Migration from Latin America in an Era of
Rising U.S. Enforcement, 630 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 137-61 (2010).
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likelihood of return migration, which had been a long historical pattern
prior to the current era. 95 As the United States has never been able to
completely seal all of the southern border, let alone water routes, border
enforcement has tended to shift border crossing away from some areas but
towards other pathways. 96 It also increases the likelihood of crossing with a
border smuggler, thus not only rendering the system more dangerous for
migrants, but also rendering border crossing a more professional
enterprise. 97 The percentage of migrants using paid guides ("coyotes") has
steadily risen, from around 80% in the early 1990s-before the recent
expansion of enforcement began-to nearly 100% by 2010.98 Researchers
have also concluded that demographic changes in Mexico may well
account for vastly reduced migration north in coming years. 99 The average
annual increases in the number of ten- to fourteen-year-old males in the
population shrank from about 150,000 per year in the 1970s and 1980s to
approximately 20,000 per year by 2010. On the other hand, it is far from
clear that the Mexican economy is improving in a way that would meet
even this reduced labor demand. 100
The data regarding post entry social control removals are similarly
demoralizing. Though U.S. crime rates have subsided in recent years, the
best evidence indicates that deportation has had little, if anything to do
with this. It is-at best-a costly, overbroad, and inefficient mechanism of
crime control.'0 ' Of course, some serious offenders and tens of thousands
of low level offenders have been removed from the United States.
Undoubtedly, this has reduced some crime within U.S. borders though it
seems to have spawned crime elsewhere, some of which has made its way
back to the United States. 102 One must also consider the costs of such
removals (in terms of law enforcement resources, the wisdom of focusing
on noncitizens as compared to citizens, incarceration costs, etc.) as well as
the substantial collateral consequences of these removals.
0 3
'5 BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 34-35.
96 id.
" Id. at 35.
98 Selected Results: Graph 2, MEXICAN MIGRATION PROJECT (July 2013), http://mmp.opr.
princeton.edu/results/002coyote-en.aspx.
99 BINATIONAL STUDY ON MIGRATION, MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES
(1997); Gordon H. Hanson & Craig McIntosh, The Great Mexican Emigration, 92 REV. OF ECON. &
STAT. 798, 798-810 (2010).
1o0 BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 35.
101 See KANTROOM, supra note 13, at 88-89.
102 Id. at 135-63.
103 id.
2015]
Journal of Law & Politics
So if not efficacy, then what? Here is a way to envision how we might
better structure consideration of ends, means, and rights. A simple grid
shows how the two major types of interior enforcement are typically
exercised against types of noncitizens. Bear in mind that the extended
border control system now strongly tends towards the informal, with fewer
procedural protections.104
Extended Border Post-Entry Social
Control Control
Undocumented Primary Secondary
Short-term non- Primary Secondary
immigrants
Long-term non- Primary Secondary
immigrants
Permanent Residents Secondary (if at all) Primary
The post entry social control system is more likely to need to be
deployed against long-term legal residents, many of whom have strong
affiliation and proportionality claims. Though it is also sometimes used
against the undocumented (especially in the recent up-tick of criminal
prosecutions for re-entry), the post entry social control system is rarely
necessary near the border for short-term residents.
To develop a better system we might also consider a more refined
presumptive'0 5 "legitimacy" grid that includes such factors as length of
residence, claims of hardship, and family ties."0 6
'04 American Exile, Rapid Deportations that Bypass the Courtroom, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(Dec. 2014), https://www.aclu.org/american-exile-rapid-deportations-bypass-courtroom; JENNIFER LEE
KOH ET AL., DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS (2011), available at
http://web.stanford.edu/group/irc/DeportationWithoutDueProcess 2011 .pdf.
105 1 call this presumptive because, as noted above, there are many factors that can render
enforcement at or near the order highly illegitimate and unjust.
106 Retroactivity and the possibility of alternative enforcement measures such as criminal
prosecution also lower the legitimacy of immigration enforcement.
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Family/Other
Time Family/ Fear of Harm 
Conduct
Affiliation Mechanisms
Higher Recent No ties Minimal Non-Violent None
Legitimacy entrants
Lower Long termLoe c Lnts Strong ties Substantial Serious Crime SomeLegitimacy residents
Such grids are undoubtedly crude. They may also seem cumbersome
and judicially oriented. They seem inevitably to require inefficient, time-
consuming discretionary balancing. However, as noted, the legal history of
deportation indicates a recurrent recognition of the propriety of these
factors. Indeed, one of the most important themes of modem deportation
history-the rise of discretionary forms of relief from deportation-is
perhaps best understood in this way. Rather than re-introducing such
considerations in the unpredictable guises of prosecutorial discretion or
even discretionary relief administered by immigration judges, could we
make them central to the enforcement system itself? Implementing these
considerations would lead to a few possible approaches.
Most fundamentally, one might first ask why we deport long-term legal
residents who commit crimes, instead of simply punishing them in the
criminal justice system as we do citizens. It is hardly unthinkable to simply
eliminate this form of removal from our system. Many in Europe have
argued in favor of such policy reform with some success. 10 7 The arguments
in favor of such elimination are substantial. First, we would instantiate, in a
structural way, the basic principles of justice and fairness that undergird
legitimacy. Second, we would save hundreds of millions of dollars, even
by the most conservative estimates. This includes the costs of investigating
such people, placing them into removal proceedings, adjudicating such
proceedings, dealing with post-removal issues, and dealing with the
immeasurable costs to families and communities and receiving
countries. 108 Third, we would save enormous time and energy in our
immigration courts and among our criminal justice system, which must
process such possible deportees, detain them, etc. Fourth, we would
rectify, at least in part, various doctrinal distortions in our legal system,
107 See Kanstroom & Chicco, supra note 72.
08 See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 1 3.
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such as the rigid civil/criminal divide of Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
the indefensible idea that such removal is not constitutional punishment,
etc.
To be sure, there are also strong arguments to be made against such a
proposal. On the most fundamental level, one might argue that this
proposal undercuts the citizen/alien divide itself and depreciates the value
of U.S. citizenship. It is also likely to be spectacularly unpopular
politically, as the case to be made for "criminal aliens" is, to say the least,
nuanced, and the constituency in support of it is small. Further, this
political unpopularity could ultimately result in backlash and harsher, more
vague, more discretionary enforcement modalities. Some might also argue
that the removal of criminals is a legitimate, flexible enforcement tool that
dovetails passably well--even if imperfectly-with the more rigid
structures of the criminal justice system. It gives the government
particularly useful flexibility to deal with crime, as well as a host of foreign
policy and national security concerns. Finally, it is generally well
accepted-at least as a concept-historically and among virtually all
nation-states. I will leave it to thoughtful readers to weigh these various
arguments for and against my strongest proposal. First, however, let me
also offer two other related suggestions for reform of immigration
enforcement.
A. Proportionality, Affiliation, and Time
The first suggestion is to take proportionality and affiliation rights
seriously in a structural way. This suggestion is neither radical nor even
especially unique as a matter of legal theory. As we have seen, the current
system tends to relegate proportionality and affiliation to limited ad hoc
mechanisms, often costly, time-consuming, and highly dependent on such
variables as whether a person has legal counsel, which immigration judge
hears the case, what modes of procedure are chosen by ICE, etc. One could
certainly improve on this discretionary adjudications model, as I and others
have long suggested. 109 One could look to the European or Inter-American
system for guidance.
How might we approach these questions less as discretionary balancing
and more as structure? The simplest model, short of abolition, is a statute
of limitation. A recent study found that the median time span between
entry and apprehension for certain types of extended border control
removals was four days. Compare this to the median time for immigration
109 See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 13, 210-27.
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apprehension following a criminal conviction: 380 days." 0 Indeed, some
54,000 removals from FY 2003 to 2013 were due to a criminal conviction
that had taken place more than five years earlier."' As noted, many of
those removed for crime have been LPRs for many years. Moreover,
immigration judges granted some 50% of applications for discretionary
relief by LPRs during the ten-year period from 2003 to 2013. Let us
assume that there were good reasons for so high a grant rate. Note, too, that
the immigration court system is completely overwhelmed. Structural
mechanisms could thus be more efficient, cheaper, and fairer. The statute
of limitation could be based either upon the length of time between
conduct and the commencement of removal proceedings or upon the length
of time between initial entry in the United States and removal. Neither is a
new idea. Early deportation statutes that aimed at prostitutes, for example,
contained one and three year time limitations after entry. 12 The 1953
Presidential Immigration Commission recommended--during the height of
the Cold War-a general ten-year statute of limitations for any lawful
immigrant."l 3 As the Commission noted, "That it is wrong to keep the
threat of punishment indefinitely over the head of one who breaks the law
is a principle deeply rooted in the ancient traditions of our legal system."' 14
The current system contains a few limits of this type. Some post-entry
social control grounds are already time-limited, particularly the "moral
turpitude" basis for removal. Registry" 5 is another obvious example, but it
is analogous to lagging minimum wage laws in that it currently requires
entry before 1972 and has not been updated. Also, it contains numerous
discretionary criteria, such as "good moral character," that render it
something of a hybrid model. But, let us recall the similarities discussed
above between post entry social control removals and criminal
prosecutions. The statute of limitations for most federal crimes is five
years. Why does this not make sense for removal? It seems particularly apt
for post entry social control removals of those who are otherwise in legal
'10 Rosenblum & McCabe, supra note 5, at 4.
.Id. at 17 (noting that incarceration may account of many time lags, and that most of these
removals were for FBI Part I or FBI Part 2 (violent) offenses). However, shows some 25,000 removals
were due to nonviolent offenses, drugs, traffic (other than DUO and "nuisance" crimes. Id. at tbl.4.
112 KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 47, at 125-130.
"3 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, supro note 70, at 198.
114 Id. at 197, 202 (discussing one crime of moral turpitude and other criminal grounds).
I' See INA § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012) (offering a lawful admission for noncitizens who arrived
in the United States before 1972, are of good moral character, and are not inadmissible based on
various enumerated grounds, including ties to terrorism or conviction of a crime of moral turpitude).
See Wishnie, supra note 80, at 440.
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status, as the objection could not be made in that scenario that it facilitates
a continuing offense or constitutes a back door to legal status.
Mike Wishnie has highlighted another arena in which proportionality
and recognition of affiliation should play a bigger role. Current deportation
laws ban lawful return for at least five years and in some cases, forever.
The law requires five years if the removal order is entered upon one's
arrival or attempted entry into the United States, ten years if the removal
proceeding is commenced after initial entry, twenty years for a second or
subsequent order, and a lifetime ban if the person was convicted of an
"aggravated felony."'1 6 Although one can understand the deterrence goals
of such laws, they are surely disproportionate for minor aggravated
felonies, of which there remain many. They may also be disproportionate
for re-entry cases that do not consider the compelling reasons that often
motivate people to re-enter without authorization.
B. Graduated Sanctions
The bars on re-entry have at least one virtue that is lacking in much of
the rest of the removal regime: they embody a regime, albeit a harsh one,
of "graduated sanctions." This enforcement model is commonplace in
other areas of enforcement, particularly involving juveniles and drug
offenses. In juvenile law, for example, the term has been statutorily defined
as:
[A]n accountability-based, graduated series of sanctions
(including incentives, treatment, and services) . . .to hold
such juveniles accountable for their actions and to protect
communities from the effects of juvenile delinquency by
providing appropriate sanctions for every act for which a
juvenile is adjudicated delinquent, by inducing their law-
abiding behavior, and by preventing their subsequent
involvement with the juvenile justice system.
11 7
More generally, the concept is "a conceptual framework for a
continuum of disposition options that juvenile court personnel, particularly
judges, probation officers and other similar court officials can use for
1168 U.S.C. § I l82(a)(9)(A)(i)-(iii) (2012). These bar on lawful return may be waived by the
Attorney General. The statutory category "aggravated felony" is extremely expansive and includes a
wide range of misdemeanors and nonviolent offenses. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact
of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936,
1939-41 (2000).
. 42 U.S.C. § 5603(24) (2012).
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delinquency reduction." '" 8 Such systems use a "multi-tiered continuum" of
intervention of services and programs that allows the system to match
specific characteristics of the offender, typically with an objective
assessment or structured decision making instrument." 
9
Two things should be immediately apparent about graduated sanctions:
First, they seek to implement goals not only of retribution and deterrence,
but also rehabilitation, with due recognition for proportionality. Second,
they tend to be post-hoc guidelines for judges who exercise discretion.1
2
0
What may not be as apparent is the fact that the goal of efficiency also
animates graduated sanctions. As one report noted, "[u]sing risk and needs
assessment in conjunction with graduated sanctions combines public safety
with cost efficiency." 121 A thoughtful regime of graduated sanctions
"increases the likelihood that serious offenders will be incarcerated while
those who present a lesser danger are placed in less expensive, community-
based programs."12
2
This model could easily be applied in removal proceedings, particularly
against first-time youthful offenders, the vast majority of whom tend to be
relatively young men. Instead of the current "one size fits all" and "one
strike and you are out" models, why not build in the authority for
immigration judges to partner with existing social service and probation
networks to craft creative alternatives to removal and lifetime banishment?
Such a model would constitute an intermediary mechanism between-on
the one hand-binary removal systems, and-on the other-relatively
contentless ad hoc relief from removal discretion by judges. It would be
cost-effective, humane, and responsive to the legitimate goals of post entry
" Other names for accountability-based sanctions systems include: graduated options, graduated
alternatives, graduated responses, graduated incentives and graduated consequences. David G. Gamble,
Graduated Sanctions, NASJE NEWS QUARTERLY, http://nasje.org/news/newsletter0702/
resources02.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
19 Id; see also JUVENILE SANCTIONS CTR., NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT
JUDGES, GRADUATED SANCTIONS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS: A PROGRAM MODEL AND PLANNING
GUIDE: DISPOSITIONAL COURT HEARING TO CASE CLOSURE, VOL. II (2005), available at
http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/vol.2planningguidejscl8 0.pdf.; MARK MATESE, OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PROGRAM, ACCOUNTABILITY-BASED SANCTIONS (1997),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/fs-9758.pdf.
'20 See, e.g., Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States 1994-1996: The Movement Towards
Graduated Sanctions, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PROGRAM,
http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/reform/ch2_f.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2015) ("Inherent in graduated
sanctions programs is the notion of providing swift and appropriate punishment to youth offenders
based on the gravity of their offense and an assessment of the potential risk for reoffending, coupled
with appropriate treatment to reduce the risk of recidivism.").
121 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO COMPREHENSIVE
JUVENILE JUSTICE (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles I/Digitization/16515ONCJRS.pdf.
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social control removal, such as they are. Moreover, it would recognize the
convergence between the criminal law and deportation laws of this type.
1z3
Of course, one can also imagine objections to this proposal. It could be,
one might say, inevitably cumbersome, expensive, too discretionary, and
lacking in institutional and political support. It is also, as noted, generally
more akin to a sentencing regime, rather than a re-structuring of the front-
end standards of the removal system. But, before we reject a new model
too quickly, let us recall the dysfunctionality of the current system and its
dreadful human costs. Why not a pilot project, akin to what is now being
tried in New York and other venues with a right to counsel? Such a
"graduated sanctions" experiment would be rather easy to implement in a
local immigration court, and its effectiveness would be equally easy to
measure, in terms of recidivism, likelihood of attendance at hearings, and
effects on families.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS CREATIVE RE-IMAGINATION OF INTERIOR
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
[S]o long as the law permits aliens to remain in this
country without time limit, . . . a moral, if not a legal,
obligation exists to treat such people fairly. Especially
where ... the alien is permitted to become a full-fledged
member of the community in which he lives; to be
employed, to own property, to marry and raise a family, to
pay taxes, to serve in the armed forces, and otherwise to
participate in all activities save those reserved for citizens,
such as voting. It is clear, therefore, that to aliens who
have lived in the United States for many years, who have
become integrated into its community life, and whose ties
to their mother country may have become remote and
purely technical, a deportation order becomes the most
severe and cruel penalty imaginable.'
24
In conclusion, we should squarely face a few dominant realities that
must govern our analysis going forward. First, the economic and social
forces that have compelled millions of poor people to migrate to the United
States show little signs of abating in the foreseeable future. Complete
123 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
124 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, supra note 70, at 193-94.
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control of the border is a fantasy. Ultimate solutions require paying real
attention to the forces that drive migrants north in the first place. Failing
that, border control is far better than either massive interior enforcement or
sub-contracting enforcement to Mexican or Guatemalan police.
Second, all available studies show that post-entry social control
removal of "criminal aliens" is not an optimal crime control strategy in
terms of the targeted population, the expense, the effects on community-
police relations, etc. It has had enormous negative consequences,
predominantly on young men of color and their families.
Third, the Obama Administration's focus on the post entry social
control rationale (i.e., "smart enforcement"), while understandable
politically and in some cases legitimate (e.g., for very serious crimes
committed by relatively recent entrants with few or no family ties), is
much more problematic than is generally thought. It raises both practical
problems (as illustrated by Secure Communities) and profound normative
questions.
As part of a broad legalization program that rectifies the accumulated
problems of the past two decades or so, we should seriously re-think
interior enforcement, and should consider:
1. The elimination or at least the dramatic de-emphasis of post-entry
social control removals. At the very least, a substantial revision of
the aggravated felony category is needed.
2. The serious consideration of statutes of limitation analogous to
those in the criminal justice system, and meaningful
implementation of proportionality and affiliation constraints on
removal that are analogous to the protections of international human
rights law. The protections should not only be seen as discretionary
factors, but should be implemented within the basic statutory
criteria that govern removal. They could thus supplant much
controversial prosecutorial discretion.
3. We should devote more thought to an experiment with graduated
sanctions in removal cases. This necessitates more creative thinking
about both the structural components and mechanisms of
deportation law. We should seriously consider forms of probation.
We certainly should move beyond the current rather harsh and
binary model that often results in lifetime banishment for minor
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transgressions thus harming families, incentivizing recidivist border
crossing and raising costs for all because the stakes are too high.
4. Finally, though it has not been much-discussed in this Article, the
government should accept the idea that the "rule of law" extends-
at least to some significant degree-beyond U.S. borders to post-
removal legal claims. Especially if the current punitive post-
removal bars to re-entry are not changed, then administrative and
judicial review of such cases should be more transparent and better
structured in order to incentivize all government actors to comply
with legal constraints and to maximize both justice and fairness. '25
125 See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 13.
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